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The purpose of this study is to examine corporate board characteristics pre- and post-Sarbanes-
Oxley.   More specifically, using a sample 1141 US publicly traded firms, board characteristics 
were identified and then changes in these characteristics were examined across the years 2001, 
2004, and 2007.  Our analyses reveal significant changes in 8 of 10 board characteristics 
examined.  Implications and areas for future research are discussed. 
  





esearch on the board of directors and corporate governance has proliferated in the last decade.  
Indeed the wave of corporate scandals that came to light during the early 2000s brought the 
importance of sound corporate governance to the forefront of both public policy and academic 
research as many of the scandals can be directly attributed to failed corporate governance or more specifically to 
ineffective boards of directors.  Corporate governance can be defined as the determination of the broad uses to 
which organizational resources are deployed and the resolution of conflicts among the many participants in 
organizations (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003).  More simply, corporate governance concerns the relationships 
between a company’s shareholders, its board of directors, and managers.  The primary role of the board of directors 
is to ensure that shareholders’ interests are being best served by the decisions of those actually running the company, 
namely top managers.  A second important role of the board is to provide resources that assist the organization in 
understanding and responding to its environment (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Boyd, 1990). 
 
From a public policy standpoint the major response to these scandals was the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 that was signed in to law on July 30, 2002.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act amended U.S. securities as 
well as other laws and served to impact corporate governance in significant ways.  The law applies to U.S. and non-
U.S. public companies that have registered securities with the Securities Exchange Commission under the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934.  As such, the act is far-reaching and impacts U.S. publicly traded firms.  Since the 
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, many company governance and board attributes have changed by legal mandate.  
However, as with any major external change to a given system changes occur that are both expected and 
unexpected.  For instance, Sarbanes-Oxley required listing standards by exchanges that require a majority of board 
members to be independent from the company, thus limiting the influence of inside directors.  However, the impact 
of this mandate is likely to have impacted other board characteristics.  An example of this may be seen in changes in 
the diversity among boards in the areas of size, age, tenure, and gender.  Further, it is likely that there have been 
longer term implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on these same board characteristics.  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine corporate board characteristics pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley.  
More specifically, using a sample 1141 US publicly traded firms, board characteristics were identified and then 
changes in these characteristics were examined across the years 2001, 2004, and 2007.  In the next section, a brief 
overview of research on the importance of board characteristics is presented.  Next, the methodology is described 
and the results of the analyses are presented.  Finally, implications and future research areas are discussed. 
    
 
R 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Two major organizational theories provide the theoretical rationale for the importance of board 
composition: agency theory and resource dependence theory.  Indeed, according to Hillman and Dalziel (2003) 
boards of directors serve two important functions for organizations: monitoring managerial behavioral and providing 
resources.  The monitoring function refers directly to the board’s responsibility to monitor managerial behavior on 
the behalf of shareholders.  One may presume that the composition of a board would aid in better monitoring.  For 
example, inside directors may have less incentive to monitor management due to their dependence on the CEO and 
the organization (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  As such, boards dominated by independent outsiders (versus non 
independent insiders) are thought to do a better job of monitoring managers.  As a further example, increased board 
size may increase the monitoring strength of the board of directors (Borokhovich, Brunarski, Harman, & Kehr, 
2005) due to greater oversight over the firm’s management (Miller, 2009; Pearce & Zahra, 1992).  Larger boards 
may also enhance corporate governance by reducing CEO domination (Singh & Harianto 1989).  
 
The providing resources function refers directly to the ability of the board to bring resources such as 
advice, legitimacy, improved external communications, and support from important external elements to the firm 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  As seen with monitoring, it is expected that levels and types of resources brought to a 
firm by its board of directors are a function of the composition of the board.  As an example, resource dependence 
theory suggests that a larger board yields benefits from the broader resource base presented by the larger size of the 
board.  Thus, increasing board size can provide an increased pool of expertise and resources for the organization 
(Pfeffer, 1972) and may permit the inclusion of a variety of perspectives (Pearce & Zahra, 1992).  Further, larger 
board size may increase diversity among board members which in turn can increase board and firm performance 
(Bear et al., 2010). 
 
Board diversity may also exist in age, tenure, gender, functional backgrounds, professional experiences, 
and education (Coffey & Wang, 1998) and each in some way or another can affect the diversity of director resources 
and thus board composition and board performance.  For example, prior research suggests that female directors tend 
to have different educational and professional backgrounds from those of male directors and may be more 
participative and democratic in decision-making processes (Bear et al., 2010).  Further, certain amounts of board 
diversity with respect to age and tenure appear to be beneficial in boards (McIntyre, Murphy, & Mitchell, 2007), as 
younger- and shorter-tenured directors are suggested on boards for a diversity of outlook (Bere, 1991; Siciliano, 
1996) while older- and longer-tenured directors are likely to provide for some stability.  Similarly, outside 
representation on boards creates more diversity and an enhanced level of cognitive conflict (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999) or differences in judgment, ideas, and viewpoints (Jehn, 1995) between board members.  Finally, directors 
serving on multiple boards can provide the firm with a more diverse set of perspectives with regards to board 




Sample and Data Collection 
 
The study sample included all firms in which complete data was available in The Corporate Library® 
Board Analyst database for the years 2001, 2004, and 2007.  The years 2001 and 2004 were chosen since they are 
years before and after the complete implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  The year 2007 was chosen 
as a more recent time frame to compare to the earlier years and to allow for the examination and identification of 
longer terms changes in board characteristics as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  The starting sample 
included all firms in The Corporate Library® Board Analyst database in the year 2001 which primarily consisted of 
firms in the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 Indices.  The final sample consisted of 1141 firms 
for which complete data was available across each of the 3 years examined. 
   
Board Characteristic Measures 
 
 We chose 10 measures for this study.  These measures broadly covered general board characteristics like 
size and composition as well as other important areas like demographics and diversity.  Variable means were 
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calculated for each year of the study 2001, 2004, and 2007 and are reflective of the values of the measures as 
reported for each of the years examined. 
 
 Board size was calculated as the total number of directors on a given board (excluding Emeritus and 
Advisory member positions).  Board tenure is the average number of years of service with the firm of board 
members.  Board age was calculated as the average age of board members. 
 
 Tenure heterogeneity was calculated as the coefficient of variation for board tenure.  The coefficient of 
variation is commonly used to capture demographic heterogeneity.  Tenure heterogeneity measures the dispersion of 
the tenures of a firm’s board members.  Greater tenure heterogeneity would indicate greater dispersion in average 
tenures of board members and thus should indicate greater diversity.  Likewise age heterogeneity was calculated as 
the coefficient of variation for board age and measures the dispersion in the ages of a firm’s board members.  
Women directors was calculated as the sum of women directors on a given board divided by the total number of all 
directors on a given board. 
 
 Inside directors was calculated as the number of directors who are executives of the company divided by 
the total number of all directors on a given board.  Directors over 70 years old was calculated as the sum of all 
directors over the age of 70 on a given board divided by the total number of all directors on a given board.  Boards 
directors serve on is the average number of boards that directors of a company serve on.  Directors failed 
attendance represents the number of directors that that have failed to meet the board’s minimum attendance 




 Data from the 1141 firms sampled were analyzed using ANOVA and pairwise means comparisons.  
ANOVA was used to test whether significant differences in the board characteristics existed across the years 2001, 
2004, and 2007.  We then ran pairwise means comparisons on the board characteristics to establish between which 
of these years significant differences existed and the direction(s) of these differences. 
  
 
Table 1 Variable Means and Tests for Longitudinal Differences in Board Characteristics 
 Year 
Variable 2001 2004 2007 F  Means Comparisons* 
 
Board Size 9.59 9.67 9.77 1.06 - 
Board Tenure 9.14 9.09 8.88 1.33 - 
Board Age 58.97 60.01 60.61 55.87*** 2001 < 2004 < 2007 
Tenure Heterogeneity .712 .753 .785 25.46*** 2001 < 2004 < 2007 
Age Heterogeneity .138 .130 .125 22.95*** 2007 < 2004 < 2001 
Women Directors (%) 8.72 10.43 12.03 38.84*** 2001 < 2004 < 2007 
Inside Directors (%) 30.03 17.49 15.72 488.92*** 2007 < 2004 < 2001 
Directors over 70 Years Old (%) 8.67 9.56 9.85 2.79+ 2001 < 2007 
Boards Directors Serve On  1.99 2.47 1.74 314.12*** 2007 < 2001 < 2004 







 Variables means and tests for differences in board characteristics across the three years examined for each 
of the 10 measures examined are presented in Table 1.  Significant overall effects (p<.10 to p<.001) were found for 
all but 2 (i.e., board size and board tenure) measures.  In addition, pairwise means comparisons (also reported in 
Table 1) revealed significant differences (p<.05) across one or more years examined for each of the remaining 8 
measures.  More specifically, board age increased significantly from 2001 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2007; tenure 
heterogeneity increased significantly from 2001 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2007; age heterogeneity decreased 
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significantly from 2001 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2007; women directors increased significantly from 2001 to 2004 
and from 2004 to 2007; inside directors decreased significantly from 2001 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2007; 
directors over 70 years old increased significantly from 2001 to 2007 but not from 2001 to 2004 or from 2004 to 
2007; boards directors serve increased significantly from 2001 to 2004 and then decreased significantly from 2004 
to 2007 to below 2001 levels; directors failed attendance decreased significantly from 2001 to 2004 and from 2004 
to 2007.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine corporate board characteristics pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley.  
More specifically, using a sample 1141 US publicly traded firms, board characteristics were identified and then 
changes in these characteristics were examined across the years 2001, 2004, and 2007.  The results of our analyses 
reveal significant changes in 8 of 10 board characteristics examined.  Implications of these results and areas for 
future research are discussed below. 
  
The findings of this study highlight the shorter- and longer-term impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on 
board characteristics.  More specifically, from 2001 to 2004 significant changes were found in average board age, 
board tenure heterogeneity, board age heterogeneity, the percentage of women directors, the percentage of inside 
directors, the average number of boards served on, and the percentage of directors with failed attendance.  Of 
particular interest are our findings of a significant increase in women directors and a significant decrease in inside 
directors suggesting both a greater diversity in gender and a greater diversity in resources provided by boards.  Of 
further interest is the significant increase in the average number of boards served on.  On the one hand this suggests 
a greater level and diversity of experiences of board members while on the other it suggests that at least some board 
members may be overextended.  Finally, we also found a significant decrease in the percentage of board members 
who failed minimum attendance standards at board meetings suggesting improved board member behavior.  
Concerning the longer term impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, changes in board characteristics continued to occur 
from 2004 to 2007 and with one exception (i.e., the average number of boards directors served on) mirrored the 
changes of the earlier time period. 
 
 The findings of this study also have implications for agency theory and resource dependence theory.  
Concerning agency theory, the significant increase in independent outside directors identified in our study should 
allow for better monitoring of managerial behavior and thus better corporate governance.  Further, while we did not 
find significant changes in the average number directors on boards the trend does appear to be towards larger 
average board size.  This combined with the trend toward greater levels of other types of diversity (i.e., tenure, 
gender, and professional experiences) which is expected to affect the diversity of resources brought to the firm by 
board members should also result in improved corporate governance. 
 
There are also implications of this study for board design.  In particular, this research is relevant for 
companies wishing to benchmark their board composition against that of other firms.  Our findings may provide 
important information for firms considering making changes to their board.  Further, and as discussed by McIntyre 
et al. (2007), those in charge of board design and those charged with finding new directors may find this type of 
research useful.  In total, the results of this study combined with identified best practices of individual firms can be 
used to optimize board formation and board member selection. 
  
Like most research efforts the current study has limitations that provide opportunities for future research 
efforts.  First, this study was limited in its use of board characteristics.  Thus future research may want to include 
additional measures.  Additionally, the measures used in this study are observable board characteristics and are 
intended to be indicative of the idiosyncrasies of board members and their cognitive bases and values (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984).  Future studies may benefit by examining board composition from a more qualitative perspective. A 
second limitation is that we did not examine performance in the current study.  Future research would benefit from 
the examination of performance and of the linking of changes in board characteristics to changes in performance 
over time.  Even with these limitations it is hoped that this study will serve as an important addition to the body of 
work examining boards of directors and corporate governance. 
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